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I. INTRODUCTION
With over 3,200 international investment agreements (“IIAs”) in
existence today, IIAs continue to remain a popular tool for
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international investment policymaking.1 These agreements are signed
between two or more states in the form of stand-alone Bilateral
Investment Treaties (“BITs”), Multilateral Investment Treaties
(“MITs”), or investment chapters of broader trade and investment
agreements, such as Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”). By granting
explicit protection to investments and creating a mechanism in which
investors may access arbitration against a State in the event of a
breach of a treaty obligation, IIAs provide a secure and predictable
atmosphere for investment.2 Granting such a high level of protection
to promote foreign investment, however, comes at a cost for the host
State.3 In IIAs, host States are commonly required to grant
substantive and procedural guarantees to foreign investments.4 The
guarantee to treat foreign investment fairly and equitably with full
protection and security is a prime example of such protection.5
The benefits allotted to investors under IIAs are often inversely
proportional to the policy space reserved for the host State – or in
other words, the space reserved for a government to self-regulate in
the public interest.6 On many occasions, these benefits directly
conflict with the interests of States to enact public interest
1. See U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev, Recent Trends in IIAs and ISDS 1, 1
(Feb. 2015), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2015d1_en.pdf
[hereinafter UNCTAD, Recent Trends] (noting twenty-seven IIAs concluded in
2014 alone).
2. See Julien Chaisse, The Shifting Tectonics of International Investment
Law-Structure and Dynamics of Rules and Arbitration on Foreign Investment in
the Asia-Pacific Region, 47 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 563, 564 (2015) (observing
investor protection is implemented pursuant to relative and absolute standards).
3. See U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Sequel,
UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, 10-12, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/5, U.N. Sales No. E.11.II.D.15 (2012) [hereinafter
UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment] (suggesting the popularity of fair and
equitable treatment claims could potentially create an imbalance between private
and public interests).
4. See Filippo Fontanelli & Giuseppe Bianco, Converging Towards NAFTA:
An Analysis of FTA Investment Chapters in the European Union and the United
States, 50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 211, 212 (2014) (indicating States commit to series of
substantive and procedural guarantees).
5. See UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 3, at xiii
(observing a majority of IIAs contain fair and equitable treatment to foreign
investments clauses).
6. See Fontanelli & Bianco, supra note 4, at 212-13 (setting forth a
hypothetical spectrum from absolute autonomy granting freedom for investors to
absolute state control of foreign investments).
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regulations for safety, public health, or environmental reasons. 7 A
rise in investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) cases in recent
years is attributed to the drastic increase in existing IIAs, 8 as well as
a discord between the interests of investors and States.9
According to the website of the United States Trade
Representative, ISDS is defined as a “neutral, international
arbitration procedure . . . [that] seeks to provide an impartial, lawbased approach to resolve conflicts.”10 Modern IIAs ordinarily
include detailed ISDS provisions which specify a forum to ensure
host States uphold public treaties concerning international
investments.11 ISDS provisions in IIAs establish a mechanism that
permits foreign investors to launch international arbitration claims
against host States for breaching investment agreements.12
An emerging consensus for the need to reform the IIA and ISDS
regime, as well as increased transparency in IIA treaty practice,
foster a more conducive atmosphere for State autonomy and
7. See UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 3, at 2 (finding a
broad interpretation of minimalist treaty language can cause the fair and equitable
treatment standard to be unpredictable).
8. See UNCTAD, Recent Trends, supra note 1, at 5 (reporting six hundred
eight overall total known ISDS claims pursuant to IIAs, including record highs in
recent years of fifty-four new ISDS cases in 2012, fifty-nine new ISDS cases in
2013, and forty-two new ISDS cases in 2014); see also Nigel Blackaby et al.,
Arbitration under Investment Treaties, in REDFERN AND HUNTER ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 8.10 (6th ed., 2014) (indicating that the current number of
known treaty-based ISDS cases in 2014 has increased nearly tenfold since 2000).
9. See Tamara L. Slater, Investor-State Arbitration and Domestic
Environmental Protection, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 132-33 (2015)
(explaining that so long as the foreign investor is covered by foreign investment
protection provisions under an IIA between the investor’s home country and the
host State, these provisions permit the foreign investor to file claims against the
governments of States in an international arbitration forum).
10. See generally FACT SHEET: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS),
OFFICE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds
(last visited July. 17, 2016) [hereinafter FACT SHEET] (expounding three
rationales behind government implementation of ISDS: “1. [t]o resolve investment
conflicts without creating state-to-state conflict, 2. [t]o protect citizens abroad, and
3. [t]o signal to potential investors that the rule of law will be respected”).
11. See Mark Weaver, The Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP): ISDS Provisions, Reconciliation, And Future Trade
Implications, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 225, 228 (2014).
12. See id. at 235.
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sustainable development.13 ISDS’ critics disapprove of ISDS’ level
of protection commonly found in U.S. IIAs, such as the “fair and
equitable treatment” (“FET”) standard, serve as a tool for investors
to restrict host States from enacting necessary domestic regulation. 14
On the other hand, there is a palpable need to protect investments
from arbitrary, discriminatory, or abusive acts of the host State.15
This school of thought maintains that a private, transnational system
for dispute resolution is better suited to fairly resolve an investor’s
dispute with a State than the State’s own domestic court system.16
Part II of this Comment surveys the various formulations and
elements of the “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection
and security” clauses in modern IIAs. It begins with an explanation
of the minimum standard of treatment—the international norm from
which these two clauses derive in U.S. treaty practice.17 Part II of this
Comment then examines these provisions as stated in the North
American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), the Dominican
Republic-Central America-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA”),
the 2004 and 2012 U.S. Model BITs, and the Trans-Pacific
13. See UNCTAD, Recent Trends, supra note 1, at 1 (“The year saw important
multilateral developments geared towards increased transparency in ISDS. These
include the . . . United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Rules on Transparency and the adoption of the Convention on
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, which will be opened for
signature later in 2015.”).
14. See UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 3, at 9-10 (“[I]t
is necessary to strike a balance between the expectations of the investor and those
of the host country and host community in order to establish approaches to
interpretation reflecting the actual social and policy context in which foreign
investors find themselves.”); see also Slater, supra note 9, at 132-33 (indicating
that critics are concerned that as corporations become larger and more influential
in global politics and trade negotiations, they will disproportionately control and
benefit from IIAs at the expense of state sovereignty).
15. See UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 3, at 31 (finding
the prohibition of arbitrary, unreasonable, and discriminatory measures does not
delineate the FET standard’s general scope).
16. See Slater, supra note 9, at 136 (“[I]nvestors often fear political influence,
incompetence, or “home town justice” in domestic court systems.”).
17. Free Trade in the Pacific: A Small Reason to be Cheerful, ECONOMIST
(Nov. 19, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21538758 [hereinafter Free
Trade in the Pacific]; Jessica Glenza, TPP Deal: US and 11 Other Countries
Reach Landmark Pacific Trade Pact, GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.the
guardian.com/business/2015/oct/05/trans-pacific-partnership-deal-reached-pacificcountries-international-trade.
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Partnership (“TPP”).18
The TPP is a massive trade agreement comprised of thirty
chapters19 expected to set binding policy for its Member States on a
wide variety of topics ranging from investment, the environment,
intellectual property, and many others.20 The following twelve States
concluded TPP negotiations on October 5, 2015: Australia, Canada,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Vietnam, Chile, Brunei, Singapore,
New Zealand, and the United States.21 These States signed the TPP
on February 4, 2016 but some of these governments require that the
agreement undergo a ratification period.22 The ratification period, if
successful, will ensure approval of the final text of the TPP by the
Member States’ respective governments and allow implementation
of the TPP to proceed.23
Part III analyzes Article 9.6 of the TPP, which adds innovative
18. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; The Dominican Republic-Central
America-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5, 2004, 06 U.S.T. 63 [hereinafter
CAFTA]; Trans-Pacific Partnership, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/
tpp-full-text (last visited June 16, 2016) [hereinafter TPP]; 2004 U.S. Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. Dep’t of State, art. 5 (2) (b),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf (last visited July 16,
2016) [hereinafter 2004 U.S. Model]; 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty, U.S. Dep’t of State, art. 5 (2) (b), http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/188371.pdf (last visited July 16, 2016) [hereinafter 2012 U.S. Model].
19. TPP.
20. See Meredith Wilensky, Reconciling International Investment Law and
Climate Change Policy: Potential Liability for Climate Measures Under the TransPacific Partnership, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10683, 10683 (2015) (observing the TPP
goes beyond just trade).
21. See Glenza, supra note 17; see also Free Trade in the Pacific, supra note
17 (noting the combined gross domestic product (“GDP”) of the TPP’s Member
States totals 40% of the world’s GDP).
22. See Rebecca Howard, Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Deal Signed, But
Years of Negotiations Still to Come, REUTERS (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-trade-tpp-idUSKCN0VD08S (reporting the ratification period will
span for two years and involve at least six countries approving the TPP’s final
text).
23. See Jonathan T. Stoel & Michael Jacobson, U.S. Free Trade Agreements
and Bilateral Investment Treaties: How Does Ratification Differ?, KLUWER ARB.
BLOG (Oct. 28, 2014), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2014/10/28/u-s-free-tradeagreements-and-bilateral-investment-treaties-how-does-ratification-differ/
(contending the United States’ approval of the TPP is influenced by the United
States’ political environment).
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language limiting the scope of an investor’s ability to assert claims
against Member States for alleged violations of their “legitimate
expectations.”24 This section argues that, notwithstanding the novel
provisions, the FET clause as articulated in the TPP continues to
violate international law, vis-à-vis its inconsistency with the
principles of state sovereignty.25 Furthermore, Part III also argues
that although the TPP exemplifies a step forward in narrowing the
scope of liability of States under the FET clause, regulatory
government action can still be unfairly subjected to arbitral awards in
IIA arbitration.26
Lastly, Part IV recommends how future IIAs may more fairly
balance the State’s interest in enacting public policy regulations and
the investor’s interest in protecting their foreign assets. Part IV also
advocates the creation of a more structured arbitral tribunal in
investment treaty disputes that incorporates a review mechanism to
improve consistency, transparency, and fairness.

II. BACKGROUND
Part II provides a short primer on the “fair and equitable
treatment” and “full protection and security” standards within the
modern international investment law regime. Many other articles
have offered more extensive accounts of the development of this
regime;27 therefore, this section focuses on more relevant aspects of
24. See TPP, art. 9.6(4).
25. See Roman Kwiecień, Does the State Still Matter? Sovereignty,
Legitimacy, and International Law, 32 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 45, 57 (2012)
(drawing the following conclusions about state sovereignty: “1) sovereignty is a
natural feature of every State; 2) owing to sovereignty every State is its own judge;
3) all States are equal on account of their sovereignty; 4) limitations on State
sovereignty are constituted by the sovereignty of other States.”).
26. See UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 3, at 1 (finding
the FET standard shields investors from States’ arbitrary, discriminatory or abusive
actions).
27. See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1524-45 (2005) (discussing of the progression of the
BIT regime and the nuts and bolts of the investment arbitration process); see also
Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the
Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 49-75 (2013) (studying the
different approaches that guided and continue to persuade the international
investment law regime).
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investor-state regulatory disputes to U.S. IIA treaty practice and the
TPP. Part B explains the concept of the international minimum
standard of treatment, to which the standards of “fair and equitable
treatment” and “full protection and security” are commonly linked in
U.S. IIAs. Part C then examines the evolution of the specific
language of these two standards in contemporary U.S. IIA treaty
practice.

A. ORIGINS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF “FAIR AND EQUITABLE
TREATMENT”: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
The notion of fair and equitable treatment existed long before
modern-day IIAs;28 these clauses appeared in early international
agreements such as United States Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation treaties; the Havana Charter for an International Trade
Organization (1948); and the 1967 Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) Draft Convention on the
Protection of Foreign Property (“Draft OECD Convention”).29 In
fact, most OECD countries modeled their IIAs after the Draft OECD
Convention.30 Today, the FET clause is commonly found in most
bilateral, multilateral, and regional treaties in force.31
In modern practice, the FET standard shields investors against
severe instances of arbitrary, discriminatory, or abusive acts of a host
State.32 According to Christoph Schreuer, the FET standard is “the

28. See generally Working Papers on International Investment, Fair and
Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law 3 (OECD, Working
Paper No. 2004/3, 2004), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP2004_3.pdf [hereinafter OECD Working Paper] (recounting an expansive account
of the origins and applications of the FET standard).
29. See, e.g., OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property,
art. 1(a), Oct. 12, 1967, 7 I.L.M. 117, 119 (1968) [hereinafter OECD Draft
Convention] (“Each Party shall . . . ensure [FET] to the property of the nationals of
the other Parties. . . the most constant protection and security to such property and
shall not in any way impair the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or
disposal thereof by unreasonable or discriminatory measures.”).
30. See UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 3, at 5.
31. See, e.g., Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral
Practice, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 357, 358-59 (2005) (stating examples of
multilateral treaties containing the FET include the Convention Establishing the
Multilateral Investment Agency of 1985 (the “MIGA Convention”), NAFTA, and
the Energy Charter Treaty of 1994).
32. UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 3, at 1.
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most important standard in investment disputes.”33 The difficulty
with the FET standard lies in its ambiguity; it is not a clearly defined
statement of a legal obligation.34
Tribunals have substantial discretion when reviewing the
“fairness” and “equity” of State conduct on a case-by-case basis.35
However, the lack of clarity surrounding the FET standard has
spurred considerable disagreement between tribunals in IIA cases
about whether the FET standard is encompassed within the minimum
standard of treatment of foreign nationals under customary
international law or whether it is an obligation of the State
independent of customary international law.36

B. THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF TREATMENT AND THE NEER
STANDARD
Generally speaking, minimum standards of treatment outline the
benefits or protections that a member state of a treaty must extend to
all non-domestic investors.37 With regard to IIAs, minimum
standards of treatment provide a treaty-defined baseline by which a
State must treat foreign investors.38 The broad, largely undefined
33. See Schreuer, supra note 31, at 357 (highlighting the near-universal
presence of the FET standard in treaties dealing with the protection of investments
and its common invocation in the majority of cases brought to arbitration); see also
Blackaby et al., supra note 8, at 8.96 (concluding that the FET standard is the most
regularly invoked treaty standard in investment arbitration, as well as the standard
most frequently found to be breached).
34. See Srilal M. Perera, Equity-Based Decision-Making and the Fair and
Equitable Treatment Standard: lessons From the Argentine Investment Disputes Part I, 13 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 210, 217 (2012)(noting that because a breach of
a standard in an IIA constitutes a breach of that IIA, the FET standard is subject to
the applicable norms of public international law; thus, this is presumably why
many investment disputes have centered not merely on whether the FET standard
was breached, but whether such a breach must be justified by reference to the
relevant or applicable principles of customary international law).
35. See Blackaby et al., supra note 8, at 8.97 (observing it would be
challenging to reduce FET to an exact “statement of a legal obligation”).
36. See UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 3, at 6.
37. See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW & PRACTICE OF
INVESTMENT: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 232-33 (2009) (providing that minimum
standards of treatment measure state conduct against non-contingent, objective
standards).
38. S.D. Meyers, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 259 (Nov. 13,
2000),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0747.pdf
(defining the minimum standard of treatment as “a floor below which treatment of
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content of the minimum standard has been controversial, but it is
commonly accepted that a minimum standard of treatment exists in
customary international law and it is significant to the construction of
IIA obligations.39 Many arbitral tribunals have grappled with the
issue of devising an explanation of the minimum standard of
treatment in investment arbitration cases.40 Neer v. Mexican United
States, a case at the center of the discourse surrounding the minimum
standard of treatment, provides insight into the competing schools of
thought about the minimum standard of treatment.41
In 1924, a group of armed men attacked and killed Paul Neer, a
U.S. citizen working in Mexico.42 A judicial investigation by
Mexican authorities ensued but resulted in few arrests and all
suspects were ultimately released.43 The United States brought a
claim against Mexico in the United States-Mexico General Claims
Commission, effectively for the denial of justice.44 The Commission
determined that although “better methods might have been used” in
investigating the matter, the Mexican authorities had not responded
“in an outrageous way, in bad faith, in willful neglect of their duties,
or in a pronounced degree of improper action,” and ruled in favor of

foreign investors must not fall, even if a government were not acting in a
discriminatory manner.”).
39. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 37, at 234-35 (listing the
variations of the minimum standard of treatment commonly found in IIAs as
follows: (1) treatment in accordance with the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment of foreign nationals and their property (or
sometimes simply “treatment in accordance with international law”); (2) a
guarantee of FET; (3) a guarantee against impairment by arbitrary or
discriminatory measures; (4) a requirement of host States to accord some form of
“full protection and security” to investments; (5) “compensation standards that
apply to extraordinary losses;” and (6) more favorable treatment clauses).
40. See William L. Owen, Investment Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11:
A Threat to Sovereignty of Member States?, 39 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 55, 60-64 (2015)
(indicating treaty parties’ leading investment obligations contained in Chapter 11
cases includes the minimum standard of treatment).
41. See Neer v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 60, 60-66
(Gen. Claims Comm’n 1926).
42. See id. at 60-61.
43. See id. at 61.
44. See id. at 60; see also Jan Paulsson & Georgios Petrochilos, Neer-ly
Misled?, 42 FOREIGN INV. L.J. 242, 243 (2007) (“[T]he United States brought a
claim against Mexico for an ‘unwarrantable lack of intelligent investigation in
prosecuting the culprits’”).
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Mexico, concluding the dispute.45
After languishing nearly eighty years in relative obscurity,
Canada’s pleadings in NAFTA cases such as S.D. Meyers v.
Canada46 and Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada47 revived discussion of
the Neer standard.48 Some IIA arbitral tribunals have since emulated
Canada’s approach, citing a very high bar for the minimum standard
of treatment49 as derived from the 1926 Neer case.50 Other tribunals
have distinguished the Neer formulation on the basis that customary
international law has evolved since 1926 and the Neer standard
should be confined to the context of State action in criminal cases.51
Whether the Neer case is equated with the international minimum
standard of treatment or not, the Neer case is notorious for its
articulation of the now broadly-recognized principle that State
45. See Neer, 4 R.I.A.A. 60, at 62; see also Paulsson & Petrochilos, supra note
44, at 244 (identifying two legal propositions upon which the claim was
determined by the Commission: (1) the actions of Mexican authorities in
investigating the matter must not only comply with domestic law but must be
tested against “international standards,” and (2) demarcation of a “line between an
‘unsatisfactory use of power included in national sovereignty’ and an ‘international
delinquency’”).
46. S.D. Meyers Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award
(Nov. 13, 2000).
47. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada: Award on the Merits of Phase 2 (James
Crawford & Karen Lee eds., Apr. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Pope & Talbot, Inc.].
48. See Paulsson & Petrochilos, supra note 44, at 247 (explaining that
Canada’s reliance on the Neer standard in S.D. Meyers and Pope & Talbot was
pivotal in bringing the Neer standard back to life).
49. See, e.g., Genin v. Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, ¶ 367
(June 25, 2001) (paraphrasing the Neer standard as the standard of conduct
required under the FET provision of the U.S.-Estonia BIT).
50. Neer, 4 R.I.A.A. 60, at 61-62 (“treatment of an alien [by a State], in order
to constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to bad
faith, to willful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far
short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would
readily recognize its insufficiency”).
51. See Paulsson & Petrochilos, supra note 44, at 250; see also NEWCOMBE &
PARADELL, supra note 32, at 236 (suggesting that the decision-makers in Neer did
not purport to set a complete definition of the minimum standard of treatment); see
also Mondev Int’l, Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶¶ 115-16 (Oct. 11, 2002) (qualifying the facts of the Neer
case from the facts of the present case because the physical security of a foreign
national was at issue in Neer rather than the treatment of foreign investment, while
also noting the considerable advancement substantive and procedural rights of the
individual had undergone in international law).
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treatment of foreign nationals and their property is to be determined
against an international minimum standard.52 Many contemporary
IIAs reflect this principle by explicitly equating the “fair and
equitable treatment”53 and “full protection and security”54 standards
with the minimum standard of treatment in the text of the treaty
itself, as will be discussed below.
1. Relationship Between “Fair and Equitable Treatment” Clause
and the Minimum Standard of Treatment
The FET standard exists in the majority of IIAs.55 Despite the
various formulations of the FET provision in current treaty practice,
the two leading approaches seem to either provide for FET of
investment without limitation, or equate the FET standard with the
minimum standard of treatment.56 The distinction between these
approaches in practice is negligible.57 The three general schools of
thought emerged in interpreting the FET standard are as follows: (1)
FET is an independent treaty standard with an autonomous meaning
and provides treatment protections above and beyond the minimum
standard of treatment; (2) FET reflects the minimum standard of
treatment, thus an element of the ever-evolving minimum standard of
treatment; or (3) assuming FET is an independent treaty standard
exceeding the traditional requirements of the minimum standard of
treatment, FET has emerged as customary international law.58
Furthermore, tribunals have identified the protection of investors’
“legitimate expectations” as the key element of the FET standard.59
Legitimate expectations usually stem from investor reliance on State
conduct in the form of verbal or written representations, pledges or

52. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 37, at 236-37.
53. See UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 3, at 21.
54. See id.
55. See id. at xiii.
56. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 37, at 263.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. Blackaby et al., supra note 8, at 477; e.g., Saluka Invs. B.V. v. Czech,
UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 264 (Mar. 17, 2006)
(“The standard of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ is therefore closely tied to the
notion of legitimate expectations which is the dominant element of that
standard.”).
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undertakings, or government regulation.60 Several NAFTA tribunals
have summarized the requirements of “legitimate expectations” to
include four elements: the existence of conduct or representations
made by the host State; reliance by the investor on such conduct or
representations to make the investment; the reliance was
“reasonable;” and the investor suffered damages because of the host
State’s subsequent repudiation of these representations.61
IIA jurisprudence emphasizes that State conduct needs to be
specific and unambiguous to give rise to a violation of the investor’s
legitimate expectations.62 IIA arbitral tribunals deemed instances of
State conduct involving contractual commitments with foreign
investors, informal representations, or the existence of general
legislative and regulatory framework sufficient to constitute a
violation of the “legitimate expectations” element of FET.63
The investors’ legitimate expectations, however, should be
examined objectively64 and balance the investors’ interests in
maintaining stability and certainty with the likelihood that regulatory
regimes change over time.65 Investors who reasonably relied on a
State’s assurances or enticements to invest may have a right to
compensation; should the State fail to follow through with those
60. See Blackaby et al., supra note 8, at 473 (noting that government acts
contrary to any undertakings and assurances it may have granted to investors may
amount to a violation of the State’s obligations to the investor).
61. Accord Mobil Invs. Canada Inc. v. Canada, ICSID No. ARB(AF)/07/4,
Decision on Liability and on Principles of Quantum, ¶¶ 152, 154 (May 22, 2012);
see Patrick Dumberry, The Protection of Investors’ Legitimate Expectations and
the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard Under NAFTA Article 1105, 31 J.
INT’L ARB. 47, 65-66 (2013) (“All NAFTA tribunals that have examined the
concept have endorsed the four-element definition of legitimate expectations
adopted by the Thunderbird tribunal.”); see also Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp.
v. United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 147 (Jan. 26, 2006).
62. See Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1, Award, ¶ 148
(Dec. 16, 2002) (describing the assurances received by the investor from the
Mexican government in Metalclad as “definitive, unambiguous and repeated”).
63. See Michael Potesta, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law:
Understanding the Roots and the Limits of a Controversial Concept, 28 ICSID
REV. 88, 100-01, 103 (2013).
64. See El Paso Int’l Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Award, ¶ 356 (Oct. 31, 2011) (clarifying that “legitimate expectations” is an
objective concept that results from a balancing of interests and rights, and varies
depending on the context).
65. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 37, at 281.
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promises—even in the absence of bad faith.66
2. Relationship Between “Full Protection and Security” Clause and
the Minimum Standard of Treatment
Like the FET standard, the “full protection and security” standard
is also largely undefined.67 Although the standard does not provide
guarantee or insurance against damage, at a minimum, it seeks to
provide protection against physical damage caused by armed forces,
police, insurgent movements, and civil commotion.68 The minimum
standard of treatment requires “due diligence” on behalf of States to
exercise reasonable care within its means to protect investments, but
tribunals have rejected a strict liability standard in this regard.69
The relationship between “full protection and security” and FET
has been the subject of ongoing debate both in treaty practice and
arbitral tribunals.70 Some tribunals have distinguished between the
two obligations, some have conflated them, and some have
interpreted the two principles in tandem without clarifying their
evident affiliation.71
Expression of these two standards in treaty practice has also
varied.72 In U.S. IIA practice, NAFTA explicitly tied both standards
to international law.73 U.S. BITs concluded prior to 2004 express the
66. See Loewen Grp. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3,
Award, ¶ 132 (June 26, 2003) (declaring that bad faith or malicious intention is not
an element of unfair and inequitable treatment amounting to a breach of
international justice).
67. BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 6, ¶ 8.113 (“As is the case of ‘fair and
equitable treatment,’ it is difficult to give a precise meaning to the notion of ‘full
protection and security’”).
68. See R. Doak Bishop et al., Violation of Investor Rights under Investment
Treaties, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS AND
COMMENTARY 752, 753 (2nd ed., 2014).
69. See Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No.
ARB/87/3, Award, ¶ 85(B) 561-62 (June 27, 1990) (holding that because Sri
Lanka did not do everything possible to counter the eradication of a shrimp farm
and the deaths of over twenty employees during a counterinsurgency operation, Sri
Lanka had violated its obligation to provide “full protection and security”).
70. See George Foster, Recovering “Protection and Security”: The Treaty
Standard’s Obscure Origins, Forgotten Meaning, and Key Current Significance,
45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1095, 1098 (2012).
71. Id. at 1098-99.
72. NAFTA; Foster, supra note 70, at 1144.
73. Foster, supra note 70, at 1146; see NAFTA.
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standards, then assert that the treatment and protection accorded must
be at least that required by international law.74 Modern-day U.S. IIAs
build upon this method by specifying an obligation to provide a level
of police protection required under customary international law.75

C. CONTEMPORARY FORMULATIONS OF THE “FAIR AND
EQUITABLE TREATMENT” STANDARD: THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE
The two important components of the content of the FET standard
in IIA treaty practice are the principles of good governance, against
which State conduct will be assessed76 and the threshold of liability
to be imposed upon the State.77 The most common formulations of
the FET standard are either the unqualified FET approach or the
approach granting treatment in accordance with international law and
specifying inclusion of FET.78 The source of the FET obligation
determines the severity of State conduct necessary for a tribunal to
find a violation of FET.79
1. NAFTA Links the “Fair and Equitable Treatment” and “Full
Protection and Security” Clauses to the Minimum Standard of
Treatment Under Customary International Law
The practice of linking FET to the minimum standard of treatment
under customary international law has been at the center of much
discussion and jurisprudence, specifically in the context of
NAFTA.80 Article 1105 of NAFTA, titled “Minimum Standard of
Treatment,” expressly follows this practice while also incorporating
the concepts of fair and equitable treatment and full protection and

74. Foster, supra note 70, at 1146.
75. E.g., 2012 U.S. Model, art. 5.
76. See, e.g., UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 3, at 12
(listing due process, non-frustration of legitimate expectations, and absence of
arbitrariness).
77. Id.
78. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 37, at 260 (explaining that if the
minimum standard of treatment now requires FET then there is effectively no
distinction between the two approaches, however even if FET goes beyond the
minimum standard of treatment, in most cases the application of the two standards
is likely to yield the same result).
79. See Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/3, Award, ¶ 98 (Apr. 30, 2004), 11 ICSID Rep. 386 (2007).
80. 2012 U.S. Model, art. 5.

LEITE; COMMENT 32.1 (DO NOT DELETE)

378

10/13/2016 4:34 PM

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[32:1

security.81 NAFTA Article 1105(2) further requires impartial
treatment and protection from social and political duress of
investments belonging to American, Canadian, and Mexican
investors.82
A string of ISDS cases involving expansive interpretations of
Article 1105 followed the adoption of NAFTA. In 2000, the NAFTA
arbitral tribunal in Metalclad Corp v. Mexican United States found
the Mexican Government in breach of the FET clause under NAFTA
Article 1105 when it failed to provide a “transparent and predictable
framework” to the investor.83 The following year, the NAFTA
arbitral tribunal in S.D. Meyers, Inc. v. Canada equated FET with the
international minimum standard of treatment, as derived from the
Neer standard.84 That same year the NAFTA arbitral tribunal in Pope
& Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, following the approach of S.D. Meyers,85
found the FET standard to be an additional, higher standard than the
international minimum standard.86
In response to conflicting arbitral awards adopting expansive
interpretations of Article 1105,87 the NAFTA Free Trade
81. NAFTA, art. 1105. (stating “[each] Party shall accord to investments of
investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law,
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”).
82. Id. (stating “each Party shall accord to investors of another Party, and to
investments of investors of another Party, non-discriminatory treatment with
respect to measures it adopts or maintains relating to losses suffered by
investments in its territory owing to armed conflict or civil strife”).
83. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶¶ 99-101 (Aug. 30, 2000) (finding Mexico’s dereliction
of duty to ensure a transparent and predictable framework for Metalclad’s business
planning and investment amounted to unfair and inequitable treatment).
84. S.D. Meyers Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶
263 (Nov. 13, 2000) (holding “a breach of Article 1105 only occurs when it is
shown that an investor has been treated in such an unjust or arbitrary manner that
the treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable from the international
perspective”).
85. Pope & Talbot, Inc., supra 48, at 110.
86. Id. (explaining “the . . . fairness elements in Article 1105 . . . are additive
to the requirements of international law. That is, investors under NAFTA are
entitled to the international law minimum, plus the fairness elements.”).
87. Gabrielle Kaufman-Kohler, Interpretative Powers of the Free Trade
Commission and the Rule of Law, in 7 IAI SER. FIFTEEN YEARS OF NAFTA
CHAPTER 11 ARBITRATION 175, 182 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Frédéric Bachand eds.,
2011) (pointing out that the Interpretative Note was delivered after the awards in
Metalclad and S.D. Meyers, in the midst of Pope & Talbot, and at a time when a
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Commission (“FTC”)88 issued its “Notes of Interpretation of Article
1105(1),” dismissing the view that the FET standard was “additive”
to the international minimum standard of treatment.89 Subsequent
NAFTA tribunals have generally accepted the Commission’s Notes
as binding upon them.90 The FTC’s interpretation did not altogether
settle the debate surrounding the relationship between the FET
standard and the minimum standard of treatment, but NAFTA
tribunals have accepted that Article 1105(1) provides at least the
minimum standard of treatment, and the minimum standard of
treatment may evolve over time.91 As will be seen in CAFTA and
other subsequent IIAs, the U.S. Model integrated the approach of the
NAFTA Interpretive Note equating the FET standard to the
minimum standard of treatment under customary international law.92
2. CAFTA and the 2004 and 2012 U.S. Model BITs Qualified the
“Fair and Equitable Treatment” and “Full Protection and Security”
Clauses and their Link to the Minimum Standard of Treatment Under
Customary International Law
NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes shaped the attitudes of the U.S. in
post-NAFTA IIAs and brought forth modifications to the next
generation of the U.S. Model BIT.93 The 2004 U.S. Model BIT94
number of Chapter 11 proceedings were pending).
88. NAFTA, art. 2001 (establishing the FTC as a body of cabinet-level
officials of the Parties responsible for supervising and resolving disputes and other
issues affecting the implementation, interpretation, and application of NAFTA).
89. Org. of American States, North American Free Trade Agreement Notes of
Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions § 2 (July 31, 2001) [hereinafter
NAFTA Notes of Interpretation] (explaining that “concepts of ‘fair and equitable
treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not require treatment in addition to
or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment of aliens.”).
90. See, e.g., Methanex Corp. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Final Award, pt.
IV-ch. D, ¶ 20, (Aug. 3, 2005) (asserting the FTC interpretation was binding either
under Art. 39 of the Vienna Convention (providing for an amendment by
agreement), or Art. 31(3)(a) (providing for subsequent agreement between the
parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty to be taken into account).
91. See Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/3, Award, ¶ 98 (Apr. 30, 2004), 11 ICSID Rep. 386 (2007). (relying on
the S.D. Meyers, Mondev, ADF, and Loewen cases to reiterate the content of
Article 1105 including elements similar to those identified by tribunals in
interpreting the FET standard in other IIAs).
92. E.g., 2012 U.S. Model, art. 5.
93. See Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as
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preceded CAFTA,95 signed in 2005, but both documents identically
lay out the provisions of the Minimum Standard of Treatment in
Article 5 and Article 10.5, respectively.96 In 2012, the U.S. further
updated its model BIT, yet Article 5 of the 2004 and 2012 U.S.
Model BITs also remained identical.97 These articles resembled, but
built upon, NAFTA Article 1105 in several ways.
First, this generation of U.S. IIAs incorporated a footnote to the
article’s heading explicitly stating that the minimum standard of
treatment is to be interpreted in accordance with an annex.98 The
annex explains that the term “customary international law” in the
FET clause refers to all principles of international law for the
protection of the economic rights and interests of foreign nationals. 99
Next, Article 10.5.1 mirrors NAFTA Article 1105(1), but the second
and third paragraphs include new language offering further
explanation of fair, equitable treatment, full protection, and security
standards.100
CAFTA Article 10.5.2 outlines the preceding provision, Article
10.5.1, which stipulates that the minimum standard of treatment of
foreign nationals in customary international law should be applied to
investments covered by the treaty.101 The standard clarifies that “the
concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and
security’ do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which
is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive

Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging
Global Administrative Law, 14 INT’L COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
CONG. 5, 8.
94. See generally 2004 U.S. Model.
95. CAFTA.
96. Id. arts. 5, 10.5. Because both CAFTA Article 10.5 and Article 5 of the
2004 U.S. Model BIT are identical, this comment will only reference CAFTA
going forward rather than both CAFTA and the 2004 U.S. Model BIT. The
corresponding sections of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT are implied.
97. Compare 2012 U.S. Model, art. 5, with 2004 U.S. Model, art. 5.
98. CAFTA, art. 10.5 (directing that Article 10.5 Minimum Standard of
Treatment shall be interpreted in accordance with the interpretive clause on
“Customary International Law” in Annex 10-B).
99. CAFTA, at Annex 10-B; UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra
note 3, at 9-10.
100. See CAFTA, art. 10.5.1.
101. See id. art. 10.5.2.
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rights.”102 The provision then notes that FET includes the obligation
to provide due process in court proceedings103 and “full protection
and security” includes the obligation to provide a level of police
protection to investors and their property in accordance with
international law.104 Finally, the third paragraph seeks to narrow the
applicability of an umbrella clause by limiting the possibility of a de
facto breach of this provision by violations of a different article
within CAFTA or other IIAs;105 however, this is outside the scope of
this Comment.
3. The TPP Curtails the Ability of an Investor to Bring Claims
Against States Under the “Fair and Equitable Treatment” Standard
but Leaves the “Full Protection and Security” Standard Untouched
Article 9.6 of the TPP incorporates language found in CAFTA
Article 10.5, but with some additions.106 Article 9.6 of the TPP
follows the approach of prior U.S. IIAs by linking “fair and equitable
treatment” and “full protection and security” to the minimum
standard of treatment under customary international law.107 For
example, the TPP includes the FET and “full protection and security”
language under the Minimum Standard of Treatment heading and
contains a footnote denoting interpretation in accordance with
“Annex 9-A (Customary International Law).”108
However, Article 9.6.4109 imposes limitations on the scope of an
investor’s claim of a breach of “legitimate expectations” while
Article 9.6.5110 limits the liability of the State in indirect
expropriation claims made by the investor. Although the concept of
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See CAFTA, art. 10.5.3.
106. TPP, art. 9.6.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. Id. art. 9.6.4 (“For greater certainty, the mere fact that a Party takes or fails
to take an action that may be inconsistent with an investor’s expectations does not
constitute a breach of this Article, even if there is loss or damage to the covered
investment as a result.”).
110. Id. art. 9.6.5 (“For greater certainty, the mere fact that a subsidy or grant
has not been issued, renewed or maintained, or has been modified or reduced, by a
Party, does not constitute a breach of this Article, even if there is loss or damage to
the covered investment as a result.”).
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expropriation is related to the “fair and equitable treatment” standard,
expropriation is not the focus of this Comment and will not be
further discussed. Instead, this Comment will focus on the effect of
TPP Articles 9.6.1 through 9.6.4 on the interests of the State and the
foreign investor.

III. ANALYSIS
Some academics and scholars have noted that international
investment law and IIAs are undergoing a significant shift from a
preference for private law considerations and investment interests to
a greater regulatory space for States.111 Although the added language
of the TPP in Article 9.6.4 narrows the scope of liability of States
under the “legitimate expectations” element of the “fair and equitable
treatment” clause, the remaining inconsistencies and controversies
surrounding the “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection
and security” standards are still not sufficiently addressed.112 Thus,
because the first three paragraphs of TPP Article 9.6 generally
embody previous formulations of the “fair and equitable treatment”
and “full protection and security” clauses, Article 9.6 as a whole fails
to bring consonance between treaty-based law and the domestic
administrative law of States.113
This section begins in Part III.A by analyzing both the structural
significance and arbitral interpretations of the FET clause in
investment disputes to determine the effects contemporary
formulations of the FET clause may have on the outcomes of future
investment disputes. It argues that the U.S. approach continues to
favor the interests of the investor and leaves the “fair and equitable
treatment” and “full protection and security” standards far too
abstract. Part III.B demonstrates that despite the additional TPP
provision reducing the liability of states with regard to alleged

111. See Roberts, supra note 27, at 78. Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in
International Trade Law and International Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1,
23 (2014).
112. See generally Andrew P. Tuck, The “Fair and Equitable Treatment”
Standard Pursuant to the Investment Provisions of the U.S. Free Trade
Agreements with Peru, Colombia and Panama, 16 L. & BUS. REV. AMS. 385, 407
(2010) (discussing the evolution of the FET clause in NAFTA as compared to
subsequent FTAs between the U.S. and other South American countries).
113. See Perera, supra note 34, at 218-19.
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violations of an investor’s “legitimate expectations,” Article 9.6
continues to disproportionately limit the regulatory sphere of host
states in favor of the investor. Part III.C similarly contends that the
“full protection and security” clause of the TPP also continues to
restrain the ability of a State to regulate itself in accordance with
international principles of state sovereignty because this clause
remains unchanged from previous articulations. Finally, Part III.D
maintains the international principles of state sovereignty require a
more proportionate, definitive approach to the FET clause.

A. BECAUSE CONTEMPORARY U.S. IIA TREATY PRACTICE LEAVES
THE “FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT” STANDARD UNDEFINED,
THE REGULATORY ACTIONS OF STATES MAY STILL BE UNFAIRLY
SUBJECTED TO ARBITRAL AWARDS IN FAVOR OF THE INVESTOR
In IIAs subsequent to NAFTA, it has been the general approach of
the U.S. to expressly link the FET standard to the minimum standard
of treatment under customary international law,114 yet the
relationship between these standards remain a point of
controversy.115 For example, the method implemented in CAFTA
seeks to limit the FET standard to an international minimum
standard, prevailing under customary international law.116 However,
despite CAFTA’s express inclusion of “denial of justice” as one of
those standards, it does not clarify whether customary international
law incorporates an all-inclusive international minimum standard
expressly relevant to the FET standard.117
This formulation attempts to assist tribunals in two ways: first, by
specifically noting denial of justice as an example of gross
misconduct violating the minimum standard of treatment of foreign
nationals; and second, by specifying that the minimum standard of
treatment cannot exceed what customary international law proclaims
to be the content of the minimum standard of treatment. 118 The
114. Compare NAFTA Notes of Interpretation, supra note 89, at 140 and
NAFTA, art. 1105, with CAFTA, art. 10.5, and 2012 U.S. Model, art. 5.
115. See Schreuer, supra note 31, at 385 (stating that this formulation is
established in the context of NAFTA, but in other contexts, particularly BITs, “the
answer depends on the wording of the particular clause”).
116. See Perera, supra note 34, at 218.
117. See id.
118. See UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 3, at 28 (noting
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problem with this approach is that it presupposes the existence of a
general consensus as to what constitutes the minimum standard of
treatment of foreign nationals under customary international law
when the minimum standard of treatment standard itself is not a
clearly defined concept.119
Although some arbitral tribunals look to previous decisions for
guidance, the lack of an official doctrine of precedent in investment
treaty arbitration further complicates the meaning and scope of the
FET standard.120 This exposes the standard to unpredictable
interpretations resulting in inconsistent and uncertain application of
the FET standard.121 Inconsistency and uncertainty in application
allows for conflicted, unprecedented, or potentially unfair
interpretations of the FET standard that may further hinder the
interests of the State in its ability to self-regulate.122
Notwithstanding the descriptions outlined in current U.S. IIA
that the practice of linking the FET standard to the minimum standard of treatment
under customary international law is intended to preclude an overly broad reading
of the FET standard).
119. See El Paso Int’l Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Award, ¶ 335 (Oct. 31, 2011) (commenting that the discussion of the approaches
between the FET standard and the minimum standard of treatment under
international law are somewhat futile because the scope and content of the
minimum standard is as little defined as the BITs’ FET standard; the true question
is to decide what substantive protection is granted to foreign investors through the
FET).
120. See Blackaby et al., supra note 8, ¶ 8.76; see also Perera, supra note 34, at
251 (stating that some tribunals have sought to resolve investment disputes through
an autonomous interpretation of the FET clause with no obligation to further
justify the finding by reference to international law, while others have attempted to
validate their findings on the basis of international law); see also UNCTAD, Fair
and Equitable Treatment, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that the contemporary meaning
of the FET standard rests on interpretations by individual ad hoc arbitral tribunals
with no effective appellate review).
121. Compare Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003) (detailing
the exigencies of FET in such a way that implies a program of good governance
that no State is capable of guaranteeing at all times) and MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v.
Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶ 113 (May 25, 2004)
(expanding on the broad conception of FET that the State has a duty to adopt a
proactive behavior in favor of the foreign investment outlined by the tribunal in the
Tecmed Award), with Blackaby et al., supra note 8, ¶¶ 66-67 (distancing itself
from the very broad definition laid out by the tribunal in Tecmed on which the
MTD tribunal relied).
122. See Perera, supra note 34, at 217.
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treaty practice, the FET clause is still left undefined.123 The two main
sources of uncertainty include which sources of law to use for
interpretation and application of the standard124 as well as the actual
substantive content of the standard itself.125 Attempts at expressly
defining FET have not come about until somewhat recently.126
Despite any clarifying language, most tribunals have construed the
FET standard broadly to include various specific requirements.127
Thus, the question left open in a claim alleging a violation of the
FET standard is whether the actions of the host state constitute unfair
and inequitable treatment to the investment to such an extent that
123. See id. at 218 (maintaining that the U.S. Model still does not specifically
prevent the acknowledgement of alternative minimum standards or factors which,
in the opinion of those who would adjudicate specific situations, could be viewed
as amounting to an international minimum standard under customary international
law).
124. See Blackaby et al., supra note 8, ¶ 8.64 (explaining that a tribunal will
generally apply and accord a controlling role to international law regardless of
whether a BIT stipulates the applicable law).
125. See UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 3, at 1; see also
Schreuer, supra note 31, at 366 (explaining tribunals have traditionally looked to
the “plain meaning” approach of the Vienna Convention when interpreting the
preambles of IIAs to decipher the object and purpose of the FET standard as a
method to provide broad objective protections to investors); see also Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] ( “A treaty shall be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”).
126. See, e.g., El Paso Int’l Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Award, ¶ 330-79 (Oct. 31, 2011) (relaying a historical overview of the FET
standard as discussed in prior arbitral awards before setting forth their own
interpretation of the standard); see generally ALEXANDRA DIEHL, THE CORE
STANDARD OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PROTECTION 15-179 (Kluwer Law
Int’l 2012) (providing an extensive overview of the FET standard, including the
sources of FET, its content, and scope).
127. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Award, ¶ 274 (May 12, 2005) (holding that “[t]here can be no doubt, . . . , that a
stable legal and business environment is an essential element of fair and equitable
treatment.”); see, e.g., LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/1, Award, ¶ 131 (Oct. 3, 2006) (finding that the FET standard consisted of
“the host state’s consistent and transparent behavior, free of ambiguity that
involves the obligation to grant and maintain a stable and predictable legal
framework . . .”); see UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 3, at
xiii (summarizing the State’s obligation to act “consistently, transparently,
reasonably, without ambiguity, arbitrariness or discrimination, and in an evenhanded manner, to ensure due process in decision-making and respect investors’
legitimate expectations”).
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they violate the minimum standard of treatment under customary
international law.128
Because the precise meaning FET clause remains abstract in the
U.S. Model and tribunals are left with such broad discretion in
interpreting the FET standard, tribunals may, and have, follow an
approach consistent with the interests of the investor in cases
involving regulatory enactments of the host State.129 In these cases,
even when no explicit law has been breached, if an investor suffers
substantial losses due to a host State’s exercise of its regulatory
powers, the investor’s losses are directly attributed to the State as a
result of its “unfair” and “inequitable” actions.130
The FET standard is perhaps the only way in which an investor
may attribute his losses to the State in these scenarios.131 Tribunals
justify this approach by lending considerable weight to the object and
purpose of IIAs as favoring the protection of investments.132 For
example, after an abbreviated analysis, the tribunal in Azurix v.
Argentine Republic paid substantial attention to interference with
investment under the Argentina-U.S. BIT, while minimal concern
was shown for Argentina’s objectives.133
128. See Mondev Int’l, Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶ 127 (Oct. 11, 2002) (stating that “[in]the end the
question is whether, at an international level and having regard to generally
accepted standards of the administration of justice, a tribunal can conclude in the
light of all the available facts that the . . . investment has been subjected to unfair
and inequitable treatment.”).
129. Richard C. Chen, A Contractual Approach to Investor-State Regulatory
Disputes, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. 295, 305-07 (2015) (characterizing the “investor
rights approach” as the view that the fundamental purpose of IIAs is to secure the
rights of investors and determines disputes through that lens).
130. See id. at 305 (explaining that “[the] investor rights approach sees the
primary function of international investment law as protecting the fundamental
rights of investors and analyzes disputed issues through that lens”).
131. See id. (arguing that “the general principle [of investor rights approach]
was that, similar to other individual rights that can be asserted as trump cards
against the state rights granted under investment treaties may often take
precedence over state interests”).
132. See, e.g., GS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the
Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 116 (Jan. 29, 2004),
8 ICSID Rep. 518 (2005) (explaining that “[the] BIT is a treaty for the promotion
and reciprocal protection of investments. According to the preamble it is intended
‘to create and maintain favorable conditions for investments by investors of one
Contracting Party in the territory of the other.’”).
133. Azurix Corp v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶¶
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Because Article 9.6 of the TPP follows the approach of the U.S.
Model linking the FET standard to the international minimum
standard of treatment, where the meaning of the FET standard
remains uncertain tribunals may still find for the investor in cases in
which a host State enacted regulation in the public interest. 134 This
interference with the right of a State to govern itself is inconsistent
with international principles of state sovereignty.135

B. TPP ARTICLE 9.6 LIMITS THE ABILITY OF AN INVESTOR TO
BRING CLAIMS FOR VIOLATIONS OF “LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATIONS,” BUT BECAUSE THE “FAIR AND EQUITABLE
TREATMENT” STANDARD IN THE TPP STILL GENERALLY FOLLOWS
PRIOR U.S. IIAS FORMULATIONS, ARTICLE 9.6 REMAINS AT ODDS
WITH INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY
States once had a sizeable degree of regulatory autonomy,
especially when enacting regulation concerning non-economic values
such as human health, safety, the environment, or social mobility. 136
However, the upsurge in IIAs over the last few decades has led to
investor complaints against these types of regulation.137 According to
the tribunal in El Paso Energy International Co. v. Argentina, “some
372-377 (July 14, 2006); see Chen, supra note 129, at 306 (determining that
because the purpose of the U.S.-Argentine BIT was to encourage and protect
investment, it would be incoherent with such purpose to consider that a party to the
BIT only breaches its FET obligation when it has acted in bad faith or its conduct
can be qualified as outrageous or egregious).
134. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 129, at 310 (arguing that “once each side of the
equation is determined, the proponents of proportionality provide no guidance
regarding how interests that are so different in kind should be valued and weighed
against each other. Indeed, while there may be extreme cases of disproportionality
on which the majority of decision-makers could agree, the basic act of balancing is
a fundamentally indeterminate exercise”).
135. See id. at 317 (explaining that when a tribunal treats investors and states as
equal in status,[it] overlooks the latter’s prerogative to regulate in the public
interest).
136. See Wagner, supra note 111, at 1 (stating regulation of domestic economic
and regulatory activities was originally a matter of a state’s regulatory power,
subject mostly to domestic legal and political constraints; international obligations
only existed to the extent that a State entered into a binding international
obligation).
137. See id. at 5 (confirming that “[the] increase in bilateral and multilateral
investment agreements over the last decades, guaranteeing rights to foreign
investors, has led to complaints not only against alleged expropriations, but also
against domestic regulations where no property was actually seized”).
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tribunals have however extended the scope of the FET to a point
where . . . the sovereign power of the State to regulate its economy is
negated . . . .”138
While the TPP includes additional language meant to clarify
ambiguities surrounding the FET clause, the wording of Articles
9.6.1, 9.6.2, and 9.6.3 almost directly mirror the formulation used in
U.S. IIAs since 2004.139 As discussed in Part III.A, this language still
leaves the FET clause undefined and open to broad and inconsistent
interpretation by arbitral tribunals.140 It does not reference limits of
liability, the applicable corresponding standard, or the degree of
damages that should be awarded if a breach of the FET clause in a
specific BIT is established.141 However, arbitral practice has
established some typical factual circumstances to which the FET
standard is commonly applied, including the protection of the
investor’s “legitimate expectations.”142
One area in which the FET clause of the TPP does provide
significant substantive clarity is Article 9.6.4 concerning an
investor’s “legitimate expectations.”143 The traditional standard
concerning an investor’s “legitimate expectations” was contemplated
in Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexico, which
specified:
[a] foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner,
free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the

138. El Paso Int’l Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, ¶
340 (Oct. 31, 2011).
139. CAFTA, arts. 10.5.1-10.5.3; 2012 U.S. Model, arts. 5.1-5.3.
140. See CAFTA, art. 10.5.
141. See Perera, supra note 34, at 219 (explaining that because of these
fundamental omissions, it cannot be concluded with any certainty that the type of
relief that the parties intended to include or exclude).
142. See Schreuer, supra note 31, at 386 (“Treaty provisions guaranteeing this
standard have to be construed with the help of unusual principles of interpretation,
notably their ordinary meaning, [and] their context . . . Context includes the
treaty’s other provisions, notably other standards of treatment.”); see also Glamis
Gold, Ltd. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 621 (June 8, 2009) (noting that
an investor’s legitimate expectations relate to a tribunal’s examination under
Article 1105(1)).
143. See Wagner, supra note 111, at 50 (defining “legitimate expectations” as
“the extent to which an investor relies on expectations at the beginning of an
investment and to what extent the investor could foresee changing circumstances
in the regulatory structure.”).
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foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and
regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the
relevant policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able to
plan its investment and comply with such regulations. 144

However, this perspective shifted in Methanex Corp. v. United
States, which inquired the validity of California’s ban on a fuel
additive.145 After considering the circumstances in place prior to the
investment, the tribunal determined that compensation required a
showing of “specific commitments” that “had been given by the
regulating government to the then putative foreign investor
contemplating investment that the government would refrain from
such regulation.”146 Additionally, in Saluka Invs. v. Czech Republic,
the tribunal recognized that legitimate investment-backed
expectations should be accorded protection while also recognizing
that regulatory frameworks are subject to change over time.147 This
approach paves the way for increased consistency in differentiating
situations “in which compensation is required, from those in which
the investor must simply bear the risk associated with investment.”148
Some tribunals have recognized that investors are not immune to
changing market conditions or regulatory environments and states

144. Medioambientales Tecmed S.A., Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154;
see MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd., Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶ 113 (noting that in
terms of a BIT, FET should be construed to mean “even-handed and just manner”);
see also Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador,
UNCITRAL, LCIA Case UN 3467, Final Award, ¶ 91 (July 1, 2004)(noting an
obligation of the host State not to alter the legal and business environment in which
the investment has been made); see also GAMI Invs., Inc. v. United Mexican
States, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 91 (Nov. 15, 2004)(holding that a
government’s failure to abide by its own law in a manner adversely affecting a
foreign investor may lead to a violation of the fair and equitable standard).
145. See Methanex Corp., ¶ 7 (noting that in Methanex the Claimant
specifically did not allow any criminal act under the laws of the U.S. or State of
California; nonetheless, the tribunal found Respondent’s conduct to constitute
corruption).
146. Methanex Corp., ¶ 7.
147. Saluka Invs. B.V., ¶ 264 (“[W]hen, how and at what point an otherwise
valid regulation becomes, in fact and effect, an unlawful expropriation,
international tribunals must consider the circumstances in which the question
arises. The context within which an impugned measure is adopted and applied is
critical to the determination of its validity.”).
148. See Wagner, supra note 111, at 52.
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may change their regulatory structure over time.149 “What is more
important then is not that the regulatory landscape changes, but that
the circumstances change either dramatically, or abruptly, or
both.”150
The number of tribunals that have recognized a difference among
circumstances in which compensation is necessary versus those in
which an investor must simply bear the risks of investment is still
somewhat small.151 On the contrary, several tribunals have followed
the approach outlined in Pope & Talbot, which rationalized the
dangers of “a blanket exception for regulatory measures would create
a gaping loophole in international protections” for investors.152 The
problem with this perspective is that it merely looks to the economic
effect of any State measure without considering the broader context
in which the measure took place.153
Although formulating a bright-line tactic in assessing these
circumstances is a near-impossible task, the drafters of the TPP took
a valuable step in providing guidance to tribunals on the matter by
adding the additional provisions found in Articles 9.6.154 These
provisions are completely new additions to the FET clause in U.S.

149. See Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1, Award, ¶ 112
(Dec. 16, 2002) (acknowledging that there are many ways in which governmental
authorities may significantly reduce the economic benefits of an investor, but at the
same time, States must be free to act in the broader public interest through
domestic administrative law and may be inhibited from doing so when an
adversely-affected business may seek compensation).
150. See Wagner, supra note 111, at 50-51.
151. See id. at 52 (noting that few tribunals have had the opportunity to decide a
case where true regulatory changes have occurred).
152. See Pope & Talbot, Inc., supra 48, ¶ 99; see also Glamis Gold, Ltd., ¶¶
761-67, 798-99, 800-28 (suggesting that an investor’s expectations must be based
on definitive, unambiguous, and repeated specific commitments (or assurances)
made by the host state to have purposely and specifically induced the investment
by the investor); see also Dumberry, supra note 61, at 71 (noting that the findings
in Glamis “have been endorsed by subsequent tribunals implicitly or explicitly
with occasional slight differences in the use of terminology”).
153. See Wagner, supra note 111, at 52-53 (noting that the factors that are to be
weighed when determining whether an expropriation has taken place cannot be
viewed in the abstract, but rather based on the facts presented to the tribunal).
154. See, e.g., TPP, arts. 9.6.4, 9.6.5 (exempting the mere fact a contracting
State takes or fails to take an act or grant privilege in favor of an investor’s
expectations does not necessarily violate the treaty).
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IIA treaty practice.155 A proper assessment of the factors surrounding
a State measure and an adversely-impacted investor under this
approach would require consideration of the specific facts by the
adjudicators.156
However, by specifically articulating that despite any potential
loss on the part of the investor, the State did not violate the FET
clause simply because its actions (or lack thereof) did not coincide
with the expectations of an investor, the TPP sets a higher bar against
which the harm to the investor and the State action (or inaction)
should be measured.157 Thus, Article 9.6.4 seems to follow the
approach outlined in the Methanex and Saluka line of cases
significantly loosening the grip on the power accorded investors by
the “legitimate expectations” clause.158 This approach is perhaps also
derived from several findings by NAFTA tribunals in the last twenty
years stating that “legitimate expectations” is an element, not a
stand-alone element, of the FET standard under Article 1105.159
Like the FET clause, the “full protection and security” clause as
formulated within the U.S. Model also competes with the interests of
the State to regulate itself in the public interest. Despite the
additional language of the TPP, the “full protection and security”
clause of the TPP remained untouched.160

155. Compare NAFTA, art. 1105.1 (“Each party shall accord to investments of
investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law,
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”), with
CAFTA, art. 10.5.1 (“Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in
accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security.”), and 2012 U.S. Model, art.5.1 (“Each
Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary
international law, including and full protection and security.”).
156. See Wagner, supra note 111, at 53.
157. See TPP, art. 9.6.4 (“For greater certainty, the mere fact that a Party takes
or fails to take an action that may be inconsistent with an investor’s expectations
does not constitute a breach of this Article, even if there is loss or damage to the
covered investment as a result.”).
158. Id.; Methanex Corp., ¶ 23; Saluka Invs. B.V., ¶ 288.
159. See Dumberry, supra note 61, at 60 (noting that most commentators
support the concept that “legitimate expectations” is an element of FET).
160. Compare TPP, arts.9.6.1-9.6.2, with 2012 U.S. Model, arts. 5.1-5.2.
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C. THE FAILURE OF THE “FULL PROTECTION AND SECURITY”
CLAUSE OF THE TPP TO GIVE EFFECT TO A STATE’S RIGHT TO
REGULATE ALSO VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF STATE
SOVEREIGNTY
The “full protection and security” clause can be found in the
majority of modern-day IIAs.161 Although many IIAs clarify that this
obligation is linked to the minimum standard of treatment, this
formulation leaves unclear the exact degree by which a host State’s
actions will be deemed to have violated their duty to provide
protection and security.162 Scholars have argued that the host State is
only required to exercise an objective minimum standard of due
diligence to the level of a host State in its particular circumstances.163
On the other hand, several arbitral awards have required that States
provide a guarantee of regulatory and legal security for investments
as part of their protection and security obligations.164
The tribunal in Saluka Invs. v. Czech held that the guarantee also
applied to investments affected by civil strife and physical
violence.165 The tribunals in Lauder v. Czech Republic166 and
161. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 37, at 233.
162. See id. at 309 (noting that the standard of due diligence required by the
host state is a modified objective standard which varies under the circumstances);
see also Nick Gallus, The Influence of the Host State’s Level of Development on
International Investment Treaty Standards of Protection, 6 J. WORLD INV. &
TRADE 711, 711-12 (2005) (noting that despite the similarity among BITs,
investors in developing countries still cannot determine the level of protection that
their investments will receive).
163. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 37, at 309 (suggesting that the
standard of due diligence is a modified objective standard); see also IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 509 (Oxford U. Press, 6th
ed. 2003).
164. See CME Czech B.V. v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 613 (Sept.
13, 2001) (“The host State is obligated to ensure that neither by amendment of its
laws nor by actions of its administrative bodies is the agreed and approved security
and protection of the foreign investor’s investment withdrawn or devalued.”); see
also Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICISD Case No. ARB/97/3, Award,
¶ 7.4.16 (Aug. 20, 2007).
165. See Saluka Invs. B.V., ¶ 484 (“The practice of the arbitral tribunals seems
to indicate . . . that the ‘full security and protection’ clause is not meant to cover
just any kind of impairment of an investor’s investment, but to protect more
specifically the physical integrity of an investment against interference by the use
of force.”).
166. Lauder v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 314 (Sept. 3, 2001)
(holding the investment treaty did not create a duty of due diligence on the Czech
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Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (U.S. v. Italy)167 found the guarantee to
incorporate obligations concerning judicial proceedings. The tribunal
in Azurix Corp. v. Argentina took this one step further and found the
obligation to provide “full protection and security” and the FET
standard to be interrelated such that if there is a breach of FET, then
there is also a breach of full protection and security. 168
The “Full Protection and Security” clause in the TPP mirrors that
found in CAFTA and the U.S. Model BITs linking the clause to the
minimum standard of treatment under customary international law.169
Although post-NAFTA U.S. IIAs utilize an even more limiting
approach by specifying that “full protection and security” only
requires States to provide the level of police protection required
under customary international law, this formulation still does not
ensure adequate protections to States against investors because
arbitral jurisprudence has progressively refined the understanding of
the term.170
Governmental regulatory acts which disturb the legal stability of
an investment have been the subject of recent cases,171 but the
propensity of tribunals to equate the obligation to provide full
Republic to intervene in a dispute between two companies; the only duty of the
Czech Republic was to make its judicial system available for the parties to bring
their claims, and for such claims to be properly examined and decided in
accordance with domestic and international law).
167. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. Rep.
15, ¶¶ 111-112 (finding no violation occurred because no “national standard” of
more rapid determination of administrative appeals existed and that “full protection
and security” must conform to the minimum international standard, supplemented
by the criteria of national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment).
168. See Azurix Corp., Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 408 (determining that
the FET standard and the obligation to afford “full protection and security” are
interrelated, and therefore, because Argentina failed to provide FET to the
investment, Argentina also breached the standard of full protection and security).
169. See CAFTA, art. 10.5.2(b) (“Full protection and security requires each
Party to provide the level of police protection required under customary
international law.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also 2012 U.S. Model, art.
5.2(b).
170. See COMBE & PARADELL, supra note 37, at 312 (noting that arbitral
tribunals have understood full protection and security to go beyond security
protections and includes a secure investment environment provided by the State).
171. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 160-62 (Oxford U. Press 2d ed. 2012)
(detailing that the collection of arbitral jurisprudence demonstrates that the
standards of protection in treaty umbrella clauses remains in a state of flux).
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protection and security with the FET standard as opposed to an
independent treaty standard has led to much ambiguity.172 This raises
issues of “delimitation in relation to the scope of other treaty
clauses” like FET, for example.173 Therefore, because the text of the
TPP concerning the obligation to provide full protection and security
has not changed since the time of CAFTA, the TPP does not
adequately protect the rights of States.174 Opponents may argue that
the obligation to provide protection against physical or legal
infringement is not an absolute standard; rather, it is a standard of
due diligence on the part of the host State.175 This perspective fails to
recognize that the due diligence standard is still an expansive tool for
investors.176
The concepts of “full protection and security,” “fair and equitable
treatment,” their relationship to one another, and to the “international
minimum standard of treatment” remain largely abstract. Therefore,
a stronger, more balanced formulation of these standards is necessary
to bring the interests of States in their freedom to self-regulate in line
with the interests of the investor in protecting their investments.
While States may not implement laws that unduly harm the
investments of investors, investors must be cognizant of the rights of
the State and recognize the risks of investment.177 For these reasons,
scholars advocating on the behalf of States’ interests have called for

172. See Azurix Corp., Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 408 (“when the terms
‘protection and security’ are qualified by ‘full’ and no other adjective or
explanation, they extend, in their ordinary meaning, the content of this standard
beyond physical security”).
173. See Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 171, at 160-62.
174. See id. at 169 (claiming that emergency clauses cannot be constructed in a
manner that places the investor into a less favorable legal situation than that
accorded under customary law).
175. See Perera, supra note 34, at 245 (describing one dissenting judge’s
opinion that the obligation to exercise due diligence, in the context of protecting
foreign investments, was derived from customary international law).
176. See Asian Agric. Prod. Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No.
ARB/87/3, ¶ 85(B) (opining that Sri Lanka should have attempted to use
reasonably available communication to mitigate damages to an investment during a
military operation in an area occupied by rebels such that it was out of the
government’s control); see also DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 171, at 160-62
(“Lack of resources to take appropriate action will not serve as an excuse for the
host State.”).
177. See Chen, supra note 129, at 317.
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application of the “proportionate approach” with regard to the FET
clause, as will be discussed below.178

D. INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY REQUIRE
A PROPORTIONATE APPROACH TO THE FET CLAUSE
Critics of the traditional approach favoring the rights of investors
argue that tribunals in international investment disputes have gone
astray by failing to recognize that one side of the dispute is a foreign
state behaving in its regulatory capacity.179 Contrary to the view of
the investor rights approach, it is argued that the sole objective of
IIAs is not only the protection of foreign investments, but rather an
essential “element alongside the overall aim of encouraging foreign
investment and extending and intensifying the parties’ economic
relations.”180 The public law perspective considers that when a
tribunal regulates in the public interest, “such actions are generally
within its discretion as sovereign and subject to only limited
constraints.”181
These truths call for a balanced, proportional tactic in interpreting
the substantive treaty protections of investments. Interpretations
overstating the protections to be accorded to foreign investments
may discourage host States from entering into IIAs thereby
frustrating the overall goal of expanding and strengthening the
parties’ mutual economic relations.182 The proportionality takes both
the investors rights and the rights of States into consideration by
balancing the rights of investors against public policy concerns. 183 It
178. See id. at 308-12 (discussing the application of a proportionality test when
applying an FET clause).
179. See id. at 307 (“Critics of the investor rights approach believe that
tribunals go astray by failing to appreciate the significance of the fact that one side
of the dispute is a sovereign state acting in its regulatory capacity.”).
180. Id.; see William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private
Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State
Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 285 (2010) (“It is time to recognize that
contemporary investor-state arbitrations are not merely another form of private law
commercial arbitration, with one party now being a state, but that they are more
fittingly understood as a form of dispute settlement that . . . also operates in a
public law context.”).
181. Chen, supra note 129, at 307.
182. See id.
183. See Roberts, supra note 27, at 66 (noting that an investor’s rights are not
absolute but subject to the State’s legitimate power to harm— or to redefine the
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acknowledges that sovereign states must sometimes regulate in ways
that adversely affect some individuals but should not be
disproportionate to the benefits gained.184
The first tribunal to apply the proportionality test was the tribunal
in Tecmed v. Mexico, which looked to decisions by the European
Court of Human Rights analogizing human rights claims concerning
the deprivation of property when evaluating a claim of
expropriation.185 Later tribunals adapted this principle to the issue of
FET.186 The proportionality approach has the potential to reconcile
the reasoning of tribunals, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of their
decision-making.187 Successful implementation of public-private
partnerships and sustainable development in modern times depends
on the acceptance of the proportionality approach, both in IIA
practice and by investment tribunals.188

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The inclusion of the FET standard in a vast majority of bilateral,
regional, and multilateral IIAs indicates acceptance and recognition
by States of FET as a standard of treatment and protection for foreign
investments.189 However, the lack of coherence surrounding the FET
standard created the need for a more balanced approach in addressing
the interests of investors and States.190 Despite the bold efforts of
relationship between private and public interests).
184. See Chen, supra note 129, at 308 (describing proportionality).
185. See Medioambientales Tecmed S.A., Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶
122 (“There must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the
charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor and the aim sought to be realized
by any expropriatory measure.”).
186. See Saluka Invs. B.V., ¶ 305 (formulating a balancing test to determine a
breach of FET by weighing the investor’s legitimate and reasonable expectations
against the State’s legitimate regulatory interests).
187. See Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 93, at 51-52 (noting that adopting a
proportionality test has the potential to “enhance the legitimacy of legal institutions
that undertake it”).
188. See id.
189. See Perera, supra note 34, at 251 (noting the FET standard, with a few
changes in language, has now been incorporated as a standard clause in IIAs which
shows that States generally accept the FET standard as recognition of a
fundamental principle for the protection of investments).
190. See El Paso Int’l Co., Case No. ARB/03/15, ¶ 358 (indicating the
“importance of establish[ing] a balance between the legitimate expectation of the
foreign investor to make a fair return on its investment and the right of the host
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TTP drafters to create a more balanced approach, the terms
“fairness” and “equity” in the FET clause remain undefined and will
continue to cause significant interpretative problems in the course of
dispute resolution.191 Furthermore, the TPP lacks an explanation of
the consequences of liability-creating conduct leaving the
determination of damages in the hands of arbitral tribunals with
little-to-no-restraints;192 future IIAs must mention the consequences
of liability-creating conduct.
While it is clear that the TPP attempts to provide some additional
parameters concerning the FET clause, the formulation utilized in the
TPP will not effectively limit the broad discretion given to tribunals
in reviewing the administrative actions of the host State.193 However,
opportunities still exist to implement provisions that further
strengthen the autonomy of States against the limitations imposed by
ISDS provisions; negotiations for future agreements concerning
investment such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (“T-TIP”)194 and other agreements are ongoing.
Some feasible remedies for future IIAs include replacing the FET
standard with more specific obligations. For example, formulating
the requirements included in the FET standard in the form of an
exhaustive list, instituting a review mechanism or appellate body for
tribunals to promote full transparency and accountability, or
codifying FET-citing cases to provide some form of consistency and
predictability could all serve to clarify the FET standard and ensure
more consistent application in investment arbitration.195

State to regulate its economy in the public interest”).
191. See Perera, supra note 34, at 253 (stating that a lack of a concrete
understanding of the FET standard has led to inconsistent application by tribunals
looking for the nearest approximation).
192. See id. at 253; see generally TPP.
193. See id.
194. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), OFFICE OF THE
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/ttip (last visited June 26, 2016)
[hereinafter T-TIP] (explaining that T-TIP is a comprehensive FTA currently being
negotiated between the European Union and the United States with the aim of
“providing greater compatibility and transparency in trade and investment
regulation, while maintaining high levels of health, safety, and environmental
protection”).
195. See Perera, supra note 34, at 255.
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A. THE “FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT” CLAUSE SHOULD
INCLUDE MORE SPECIFIC, SUBSTANTIVE OBLIGATIONS
The current general practice of the U.S. in explicitly referencing
the source of an FET obligation has proven only marginally
successful in limiting arbitral discretion.196 Thus, States wishing to
provide additional guidance to tribunals while restricting their ability
to interpret the FET standard in an overly expansive manner may
wish to specify precise elements of the content of the standard.
One way to qualify the FET standard would be to exchange the
general FET provision with a number of more unambiguous
obligations.197 One example of this approach can be seen in the EUCanada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”).
Article 9, Paragraph 2, Treatment of Investors and of Covered
Investments, states:
Party breaches the obligation of fair and equitable treatment referenced in
paragraph 1 where a measure or series of measures constitutes: (a) Denial
of justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; (b)
Fundamental breach of due process, including a fundamental breach of
transparency, in judicial and administrative proceedings. (c) Manifest
arbitrariness; (d) Targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful
grounds, such as gender, race or religious belief; (e) Abusive treatment of
investors, such as coercion, duress and harassment; or (f) A breach of any
further elements of the fair and equitable treatment obligation adopted by
the Parties in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article.198

The list may be exhaustive or it need not be limited to those
elements listed in CETA.199
196. See UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 3, at 108 (stating
that the rather ambiguous rules of international law and the minimum standard of
treatment have pushed tribunals to develop their own substantive content for the
FET standard).
197. See id. (positing that the FET standard could be replaced with more
specific obligations and prohibitions developed around the doctrine).
198. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), EUR. COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ (last visited July 21, 2016)
[hereinafter CETA].
199. See UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 3, at 108-09
(suggesting a list of elements outlining the prohibition of the “denial of justice and
flagrant violations of due process; manifestly arbitrary treatment; evident
discrimination; manifestly abusive treatment involving continuous, unjustified
coercion or harassment; infringement of legitimate expectations based on
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On the other hand, a traditional FET clause could be supplemented
by further interpretative guidance.200 For example, IIAs could
incorporate statements to the effect that the clause does not preclude
the State from adopting regulatory or other measures that pursue
legitimate policy objectives, the investor’s conduct and the country’s
level of development and level of business risk are relevant to the
tribunal’s analysis, or equitable considerations and other relevant
circumstances of the case should be taken account in the event that a
breach is found.201 The TPP somewhat follows this approach by
denoting that simply because a breach of another provision in the
TPP or a separate international agreement has been determined, does
not mean that a de facto breach of Article 9.6 is established.202
The main purpose of such a modification would “be to rein in
arbitrators’ creativity and remove other factors and criteria that some
tribunals have relied upon in order to find a violation of FET, such as
transparency, consistency, legality and stability of regulatory
framework.”203 Additionally, IIAs could include a provision
clarifying that the FET standard does not preclude States from
adopting regulatory measures.204

B. THE U.S. IIA MODEL SHOULD INCLUDE MORE RESTRICTIONS
ON ARBITRATORS IN THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
MECHANISM, AS WELL AS A REVIEW MECHANISM.
Most arbitration panels are comprised of a short list of judges who
are also legal practitioners. Among the small pool of arbitrators, it is
likely that certain judges are selected by the disputing parties for
their demonstrated tendencies to favor one side or the other.
investment-inducing representations or measures, on which the investor has
relied”).
200. See id. at 109 (noting that the elements can be broadened or narrowed by
the contracting parties).
201. See id. at 110 (describing different provisions that can be included in an
IIA to supplement the traditional FET clause).
202. See TPP, art. 9.6.3 (“A determination that there has been a breach of
another provision in this Agreement, or of a separate international agreement, does
not establish that she has been a breach of this Article.”).
203. See UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 3, at 109.
204. See id. at 113 (noting that because the preservation of the right to regulate
is significant to other IIA obligations in addition to FET, it may be appropriate to
apply the right-to-regulate language to the treaty as a whole).
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Furthermore, these arbitrators are not precluded from acting as
lawyers in other ISDS claims.205 This system of selection should be
overhauled in favor of a system that minimizes the potential for
conflicts of interest or bias. This may be accomplished by restricting
the number of times an individual may be selected as an arbitral
judge within a specified period of time. A version of this
recommendation can be seen in the EU-Singapore FTA.206
Second, for improved fairness and consistency in practice, modern
IIAs should implement a review mechanism.207 Currently, no IIA
exists that contains an appellate mechanism.208 Although the
Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization is not without its
flaws, this approach provides a better framework for ensuring
correctness predictability than the current ISDS system.209 The
current ISDS system need not rise to the formality of the WTO
Appellate Body, per se, but a bilateral appellate mechanism, and its
role and practical operation, should be clearly established. This
creation would “ensure consistency in the interpretation of [IIAs] and
increase legitimacy both on substance and through institutional
design by strengthening independence, impartiality, and
predictability.”210

V. CONCLUSION
In sum, despite the potential of Article 9.6.4 to contain an
investor’s “legitimate expectations” to a reasonable level, the FET
205. See Investment in TTIP and Beyond – The Path for Reform, EUR. COMM’N
(May 5, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.pdf
[hereinafter EC Concept Paper] (“The ad hoc nature of their appointment is
perceived by the public as interfering in their ability to act independently and to
properly balance investment protection against the right to regulate.”).
206. See generally Annex 15-B Code of Conduct for Arbitrators and Mediators,
EUR. COMM’N ¶ 15 (June 25, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.
cfm?id=961 (“All former arbitrators must avoid actions that may create the
appearance that they were biased in carrying out their duties or derived any
advantage from the decision or ruling of the arbitration panel.”).
207. See EC Concept Paper, supra note 171, at 9 (advocating for a bilateral
appellate mechanism).
208. See id. (“There is no appellate mechanism included in any existing
investment treaties.”).
209. See id. (explaining that an appellate mechanism would review awards for
errors of law, manifest error of fact, and incorrect interpretation of domestic law).
210. Id.
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clause as a whole within the TPP continues to elude the clarity and
specificity necessary to ensure a proper balance of interests between
the State and the investor in IIA practice. The FET standard as
historically maintained in the U.S. Model may serve as a tool for
investors to file large claims against the State for regulation it may
have enacted in the public interest. This function remains at odds
with the international principles of state sovereignty. Because
Articles 9.6.1, 9.6.2, and 9.6.3 of the TPP largely emulate prior
formulations of the FET standard within previous U.S. Models, the
TPP therefore also comes into conflict with these values within
international law.
An overhaul of the U.S. Model in favor of a more proportionate
approach is necessary to safeguard the mutual goal of continued
economic expansion and development between investors and
states—-particularly in light of contemporary public privatepartnerships, sustainable development, and climate change. Future
IIAs may shield states against the broad powers granted to investors
by incorporating a stronger, more specific formulation of the FET
standard that expressly states the consequences of liability-creating
conduct on behalf of the State. Furthermore, the creation of a more
structured arbitral tribunal and review mechanism within the
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism would promote better
consistency, transparency, and fairness in investment treaty
arbitration. These modifications would bring the FET clause in U.S.
investment treaty practice in line with international principles of state
sovereignty by providing a more effective framework to balance the
interests of the investor and State.

